Re: RFC: backporting GEOM to the 4.x branch

["Martin P. Hellwig" <mhellwig@xxxxxxxxx>]

Jeroen Ruigrok/asmodai wrote:
> -On [20050303 07:57], Matthew Dillon (dillon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
>
> >  Personally speaking I have no problem making ultra encryption available
> >  to the general public, but I do believe (personally speaking) that the
> >  *default* should be something slightly less secure just so criminals
> >  and terrorists (at least the stupid ones, which is most or they wouldn't
> >  be criminals or terrorists), don't get an automatic boost from our work.
>
>
> Since when did we dictate policy on this level?  Any serious organised
> criminal or terrorist works in a team/cell and has the brain/clue to bump it
> to another level from the default.  So I really think your reasoning here
> holds no ground.
>
> So why are we even being concerned about this given all the other security
> stuff we have in base already?

Being unfortunately enough to have some experience on this subject, well 
the terrorist / intelligence part at least not the other stuff, I would 
like to add the following in this discussion.
"Bad-Boys" that could benefit from higher security should be:
- Experienced enough to use DragonFlyBSD
- Unexperienced enough not to know how to increase the security level
- Organized enough to benefit from encrypted communication in whatever form
- Not to organized, otherwise there would be a communications 
specialized that at least knows how to increase security.

That makes the target audience who cold get an automatic boost very 
small. Although personally speaking the *default* should be the one that 
is the most simple/robust/adjustable.
Personally speaking if this by any chance affects the security level, 
thats fine with me as long as its public knowledge and there are way to 
adjust it.
I prefer not to mix politics and/or religious believes with unix, it's a 
bad match IMHO ....... vi of course ;-)

--
mph